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Abstract
We study Label-Smoothing as a means for improving adversarial robustness of
supervised deep-learning models. After establishing a thorough and unified frame-
work, we propose several novel Label-Smoothing methods: adversarial, Boltzmann
and second-best Label-Smoothing methods. On various datasets (MNIST, CI-
FAR10, SVHN) and models (linear models, MLPs, LeNet, ResNet), we show that
these methods improve adversarial robustness against a variety of attacks (FGSM,
BIM, DeepFool, Carlini-Wargner) by better taking account of the dataset geometry.
These proposed Label-Smoothing methods have two main advantages: they can be
implemented as a modified cross-entropy loss, thus do not require any modifica-
tions of the network architecture nor do they lead to increased training times, and
they improve both standard and adversarial accuracy.
1 Introduction
Neural Networks (NNs) have proved their efficiency in solving classification problems in areas such
as computer vision [5]. Despite these successes, recent works have shown that NN are sensitive to
adversarial examples (e.g [14]), which is problematic for critical applications [12]. Many strategies
have thus been developed to improve robustness and different attacks have been proposed to test
these defenses. Broadly speaking, an adversarial attack succeeds when an image looks to a human
like it belongs to a specific class, but a classifier misclassifies it. Despite the number of works on
it [4, 3, 15, 16], there is still no complete understanding of the adversarial phenomenon. Yet, the
vulnerability of NN to adversarial attacks suggests a shortcoming in the generalization of the network.
As overconfidence in predictions hinders generalization, addressing it can be a good way to tackle
adversarial attacks [19]. Label-Smoothing (LS) is a method which creates uncertainty in the labels of
a dataset used to train a NN. This uncertainty helps to tackle the over-fitting issue, and thus LS can be
an efficient method to address the adversarial attack phenomenon.
1.1 Notations and terminology
General. We denote by X the input space of dimension p, and Y = {1, ...,K} the label space,
PX,Y denotes the true (unknown) joint distribution of (X,Y ) on X × Y . ∆K := {q ∈ RK |
q ≥ 0, ∑Kk=1 qk = 1} is the (K − 1)-dimensional probability simplex ∆K , identified with the
set P(Y) of probability distributions on Y . An iid sample drawn from PX,Y is written Sn =
{(x1, y1), ...(xn, yn)}. To avoid any ambiguity with the label y ∈ [[K]], we use boldface y =
(0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0) ∈ ∆K to denote the one-hot encoding of y. The empirical distribution of the
input-label pairs (x, y) is written PˆnX,Y . A classifier is a measurable function h : X → Y depending
on a set of real parameters θ, here a NN with several hidden layers, with the last always being a
softmax function. The logits of the classifier (pre-softmax) are written z(x, θ), and z(k)(x, θ) is its
component for the kth class. The prediction vector of the classifier (post-softmax) is written p(x; θ).
Preprint. Under review.
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Adversarial attacks. An attacker constructs an adversarial example based on a clean input x by
adding a perturbation to it: xadv = x + δ. The goal of the attack is to have h(xadv) 6= h(x). The
norm of the the perturbation vector δ measures the size of the attack. In this work, we limit ourselves
to `∞-norm attacks, wherein ‖δ‖∞ := maxpk=1 |δk|. A tolerance threshold  controls the size of the
attack: the attacker is only allowed to inflict perturbations of size ‖δ‖∞ ≤ .
1.2 Related works
Works on adversarial robustness can be mainly divided into three fields: attacks, defenses, and
understanding of the adversarial phenomenon.
Our work will focus on untargeted, white-box attacks, i.e. threat models that only seek to fool the
NN (as opposed to tricking it into predicting a specific class), and have unlimited access to the NN
parameters. State-of-the art attacks include FGSM [4] which is a very simple, fast and popular attack,
BIM [6], an iterative attack based on FGSM, DeepFool [7] and C&W [2]. Note that the tolerance
threshold  can be explicitely tuned in FGSM and BIM, but not in DeepFool and C&W.
Many idea have been proposed regarding defenses. The main one is adversarial training [4], which
consists in feeding a NN with both clean and adversarially-crafted data during training time. This
defense method will be used in this paper as a baseline for comparative purposes. Another important
method is defensive distillation [9, 8], which is quite closely related to LS. This method trains a
separate NN algorithm and uses its outputs as the input labels for the main NN algorithm. It was
proven to be an efficient defense method until being broken by C&W attack [2].
LS was first introduced as a regularization method [10, 13], but was also briefly studied as a defense
method in [11]. In this paper, we generalize the idea of LS proposed and used in these three papers
and propose three novel methods relevant for the adversarial issue. We develop theoretical as well as
empirical results about the defensive potential of LS.
For a more thorough introduction to the field, interested readers can refer to surveys like [1, 18].
1.3 Contributions overview
In section 2, we develop a unified framework for Label-Smoothing (LS), and propose a variety of
new LS methods, the main one being Adversarial Label-Smoothing (ALS), and show that these LS
methods all induce some kind of logit-squeezing, which results in robustness to adversarial attacks.
In section 3, we give a complete mathematical treatment of the effect of LS in a simple case, with
regards to robustness to adversarial attacks. Section 4 reports empirical results on real datasets. In
section 5, we conclude and provide ideas for future works.
2 A unified framework for Label-Smoothing
In standard classification datasets, each example x is hard-labeled with exactly one class y. Such
overconfidence in the labels can lure a classification algorithm into over-fitting the input distribution
[13]. LS [13, 17] is a resampling technique wherein one replaces the vector of probability one on
the true class (one-hot encoding) y with a different vector q which is "close" to y. Precisely, LS
withdraws a fraction of probability mass from the "real" class label and reallocates it to other classes.
As we will see, the choice of redistribution method is quite flexible, and leads to different LS methods.
Let TV(q′‖q) := (1/2)‖q′ − q‖1 be the Total-Variation distance between two probability vectors
q′, q ∈ ∆K . For α ∈ [0, 1], define the uncertainty set of acceptable label distributions Uα(PˆnX,Y ) by
Uα(PˆnX,Y ) := {PˆnXQˆnY |X | TV(QˆnY |x‖PˆnY |x) ≤ α, ∀x ∈ X}
=
{
1
n
n∑
i=1
δxi ⊗ qi | qi ∈ ∆K , TV(qi‖δyi) ≤ α, ∀i ∈ [[n]]
}
made up of joint distributions QˆnX,Y ∈ P(X × Y) on the dataset Sn, for which the conditional
label distribution qi := QˆnY |X=xi ∈ P(Y) = ∆K is within TV distance less than α of the one-hot
encoding of the observed label yi.
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By direct computation, one has that TV(qi‖yi) = (1/2)
(∑
j 6=yi q
(j)
i + 1− q(yi)i
)
= 1− q(yi)i and
so the uncertainty set can be rewritten as
Uα(PˆnX,Y ) =
{
1
n
∑n
i=1 δxi ⊗ qi | qi ∈ ∆K , q(yi)i ≥ 1− α ∀i ∈ [[1, n]]
}
.
Any conditional label distribution qi from the uncertainty set Uα(PˆnX,Y ) can be written
qi = (1− α)yi + αq′i, q′i ∈ ∆K . (1)
This is why different choices of q′i lead to different Label-Smoothing methods, so the training of the
NN corresponds to the following optimization problem:
min
θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
SmoothCE(xi, qi; θ), (2)
where SmoothCE(x, q; θ) is the smoothed cross-entropy loss (generalizing the standard cross-entropy
loss), defined by
SmoothCE(x, q; θ) := −qT log(p(x; θ)) := −
K∑
k=1
q(k) log(p(k)(x; θ)).
It turns out that the optimization problem (2) can be rewritten as the optimization of a usual cross-
entropy loss, plus a penalty term on the gap between the components of logits (one logit per class)
produced by the model on each example xi.
Theorem 1 (General Label-Smoothing enforces logit-squeezing). The optimization problem (2) is
equivalent to the logit-regularized problem
min
θ
Ln(θ) + αRn(θ),
where Ln(θ) := − 1n
∑n
i=1 log(p(xi; θ)) is the standard cross-entropy loss, and
Rn(θ) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − q′i)T zi.
where zi := z(xi; θ) ∈ RK is the logits vector for example xi.
Proof. See Appendix 1.1.
In the next two parts, we present four different LS methods that are relevant to tackle the adversarial
robustness issue. A summary of these methods are presented in Table 1.
Paper Name q′i Induced logit penalty Rn(θ)
[13] standard label-smoothing (SLS) 1−yiK−1
∑n
i=1
(
Kyi−1
K−1
)T
zi
Our paper adversarial label-smoothing (ALS) yworsti , see (4)
1
n
∑n
i=1 z
(y′worsti )
i − z(yi)i
Our paper Boltzmann label-smoothing (BLS) q′i
Boltz, see (6) 1n
∑n
i=1(q
′
i − yi)T zi
Our paper second-best label-smoothing (SBLS) ySBi , see (7)
1
n
∑n
i=1 z
(y′SBi )
i − z(yi)i
Table 1: Different of LS methods. They all derive from the general equation (1).
2.1 Adversarial Label-Smoothing
Adversarial Label-Smoothing (ALS) arises from the worst possible smooth label qi for each example
xi. To this end, consider the two-player game:
min
θ
max
Qˆn∈Uα(PˆnX,Y )
1
n
n∑
i=1
SmoothCE(xi, qi; θ), (3)
The inner problem in (3) has an analytic solution (see Appendix 1.2) given by, ∀ i ∈ [[1, n]]:
qi = qi(θ) = (1− α)yi + αyworsti , (4)
where yworsti ∈ argminKk=1z(k)(xi, θ) is the index of smallest component of the logits vector zi for
input xi, and yworsti is the one-hot encoding thereof.
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Interpretation of ALS. α acts as a smoothing parameter: if α = 0, then qi(θ) = yi, and we
recover hard labels. If α = 1, the adversarial weights qi(θ) live in the sub-simplex spanned by the
smallest components of the predictions vector p(xi; θ). For 0 < α < 1, qi(θ) is a proper convex
combination of the two previous cases. Applying Theorem 1, we have:
Corollary 1 (ALS enforces logit-squeezing). The logit-regularized problem equivalent of the ALS
problem (3) is given by: min
θ
Ln(θ) + αRn(θ), where
Rn(θ) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − yworsti )T zi =
1
n
n∑
i=1
z
(yi)
i − z(y
worst
i )
i ≥ 0.
For each data point xi with true label yi, the logit-squeezing penalty term Rn(θ) forces the model
to refrain from making over-confident predictions, corresponding to large z(yi)i − z(yi
worst)
i , that
can lead to overfitting. This means that every class label receive a positive prediction output:
∀ k ∈ [[K]], p(k)i > 0. The resulting models are less vulnerable to adversarial perturbations on
the input x. One can also see ALS as the label analog of adversarial training [4, 6]. Instead of
modyfing the input data x, we modify the label data y. However, unlike adversarial training, ALS is
attack-independent: it does not require to choose a specific attack method to be trained on.
ALS implementation. We noted that ALS only consists in redefining a loss, taking the smoothed
cross-entropy instead of the classical cross-entropy. It is very simple to implement, and computation-
ally as efficient as a traditional training.
See algorithm 1 for an easy implementation of ALS.
Algorithm 1 Adversarial Label-Smoothing (ALS) training
Input: training data (x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . .; a given model; smoothing parameter α ∈ [0, 1];
for each epoch do
for each mini-batch x = x1:m, y = y1:m do
Smooth labels yALS ← (q1, . . . , qm) via (4)
Get predictions ypred ← model(x)
Compute loss loss← SmoothCE(ypred, yALS)
Update model parameters θ via back-prop
end for
end for
2.2 Other Label-Smoothing methods
Standard Label-Smoothing. Standard Label-Smoothing (SLS) is the method developed in [13].
It corresponds to uniformly distributing the mass α removed from the real class over the other classes.
That is, the term q′i ∈ ∆K in (1) is given by
q′i =
K∑
k=1,k 6=yi
1
K − 1y
(k) =
1
K − 1(1− yi). (5)
In this case, Rn(θ) =
∑n
i=1
(
Kyi−1
K−1
)T
zi. If K = 2, with a perfect model (i.e. z
(k)
i ≥ 0 if y(k)i = 1
and z(k)i < 0 else), we have Rn(θ) =
∑n
i=1 ‖zi‖1, an `1-norm penalty on the logits.
Boltzmann Label-Smoothing. ALS puts weights on only two classes: the true class label (due
to the constraint of the model) and the class label which minimizes the logit vector. It thus gives
"two-hot" labels rather than "smoothed" labels. Replacing hard-min with a soft-min in (4) leads to
the so-called Boltzmann Label-Smoothing (BLS), defined by setting the term q′i ∈ ∆K in (1) to:
q′i =
K∑
k=1,k 6=yi
Boltz(k)T (xi, θ), (6)
4
(a) Illustration: std. accuracies are very close (Bayes:
38/60; ALS: 39/60); adv. accuracies ( = 0.25) are
not (Bayes: = 23/60; ALS: = 30/60). Correctly
classified points within the dark area are adversarially
misclassified.
(b) Results: triangular experiment run for different
values of γ. The adversarial accuracy of ALS classifiers
is better, especially for greater γ.
Figure 1: Triangular experiment
where Boltz(k)T (xi, θ) =
exp(−z(j)(xi;θ)/T )∑K
k′=1,k′ 6=yi
exp(−z(k′)(xi;θ)/T ) is the Boltzmann distribution with energy
levels z(k)(xi; θ) at temperature T ∈ [0,∞]. It interpolates between ALS (corresponding to T = 0),
and SLS (corresponding to T =∞).
Second-Best Label-Smoothing. SLS, ALS and BLS give positive prediction outputs for every
label because we add weight to either every label, or the "worst" wrong label. However, in the
problem we consider, it does not matter if we fool the classifier by making it predict the "worst" or
the "closest" wrong class. Therefore, a completely different approach consists in concentrating our
effort and add all the available mass α only on the "closest" class label. This leads to Second Best
Label-Smoothing (SBLS) defined by: ∀ i ∈ [[1, n]]:
q′i = y
SB
i :=
K
argmax
k=1, k 6=yi
p(k)(xi; θ). (7)
The problem can be rewritten as: min
θ
Ln(θ) + α (−1) 1
n
n∑
i=1
max
k 6=yi
(z
(k)
i )− z(yi)i . Note the correspon-
dence with the opposite of the Hinge loss in the second term: this penalty tends to make the margin
between the true class prediction and the closest wrong class prediction smaller.
Training with each of these Label-Smoothing methods (SLS, BLS, SBLS) can be implemented via
Alg. 1, using Eqn. 5, 6 or 7 respectively, in line 5 of the the Alg. 1 instead of Eqn. 4. We finally
obtain four different LS methods: ALS, BLS, SBLS and SLS. The effects of ALS in particular and
LS as a general method are investigated in Section 3, and each of the four methods will be tested as
defense methods in Section 4.
3 Understanding the effects of LS
We now explore a simple example illustrating some of the implications of using LS, with regards to
standard accuracy and rebustness to adversarial attacks.
3.1 Case study: the "triangular" dataset
In a very simple set-up (univariate, linear model, binary classification), we want to show how ALS
impacts the decision boundary of a neural network, which improves adversarial robustness.
Let’s consider a problem with: Y ∼ Bern(γ) and X|1 ∼ Tri(−1, 1, 0), X|0 ∼ Line(−1, 0); where
Tri(−1, 1, 0) is the triangular law with density fX|1(x) = (x+ 1)1[−1,0)(x) + (1− x)1[0,1](x) and
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Line(−1, 0) is the law with density fX|0(x) = 2(x + 1)1[−1,0](x). The two density functions are
represented in Figure 1a.
We use a simple linear classifier: flin : x ∈ X 7→ σ(θ0x+ b0; θ1x+ b1), and let (p0, p1) = flin(x)
be the output of the model. Here, σ is the softmax activation function. W.L.O.G, assume θ0 6= θ1 and
fix θ1 − θ0 = 1 and b = b1 − b0. Thus, the model predicts class 1 if and only if x > −b. The optimal
adversarial attack of strength  is just xadv = x+  if x ≤ −b and xadv = x−  otherwise.
Bayes classifier. We easily check that P (y = 1|x) = 1 if x > 0 and P (y = 1|x) = γ2−γ if x < 0,
so ∀ γ ∈ [1/2, 2/3] the Bayes classifier predicts class 1 if and only if x > 0.
The standard accuracy is then
acc(h) = P(x,y)(h(x) = y) = P(y = 1)P(x > 0|y = 1) + P(y = −1)P(x < 0|y = −1) = 1− γ
2
and the adversarial one (i.e. accuracy for adversarial inputs P(x,y)(h(xadv) = y))
acc(h) = P(y = 1)P(x−  > 0|y = 1) + P(y = −1)P(x+  < 0|y = −1) =
(
1− γ
2
)
(1− )2
ALS classifier. To derive the optimal value b∗ for the ALS classifier, we need to compute
∂EX,Y (x,y;b)
∂b and set it to 0, where
EX,Y (loss(x, y; b)) =
∫
X
∑
y=0,1
P (x, y) loss(x, y; b) dx. (8)
To do so, let’s explore the different possible values for the loss. The loss for an input (x, y) depends
on the value taken by q. With ALS, we will have as much mass as possible on the class corresponding
to the smallest prediction value. Thus:
• Case (1): x > −b, y = 1⇒ q = (α, 1− α), loss(x, y, b) = α log(p0) + (1− α) log(p1)
• Case (2): x > −b, y = 0⇒ q = (1, 0), loss(x, y, b) = log(p0)
• Case (3): x ≤ −b, y = 1⇒ q = (0, 1), loss(x, y, b) = log(p1)
• Case (4): x ≤ −b, y = 0⇒ q = (1− α, α), loss(x, y, b) = (1− α) log(p0) + α log(p1)
Writing P(1),P(2),P(3),P(4) for the probabilities of each case respectively, we can now separate
the integral in Eqn. 8, obtaining:
EX,Y (loss(x, y; b)) = c0(α)
∫
X
ln(p0) dx+ (1− c0(α))
∫
X
ln(p1) dx,
where c0(α) = αP(1) + P(2) + (1− α)P(4), which depends on b. Thus,
∂EX,Y
∂b
= c0(α)
∫
X
∂
∂b
ln(p0) dx+ (1− c0(α))
∫
X
∂
∂b
ln(p1) dx
= −c0(α)
∫
X
1
1 + e−x−b
dx+ (1− c0(α))
∫
X
1
1 + ex+b
dx
= − [ln(1 + ex+b)]1−1 + (1− c0(α)) [x]1−1 = 0,
which yields
b = ln
(
e2 − e2c0(α)
e1(e2c0(α) − 1)
)
. (9)
The constant c0(α) depends on b, and we can prove that Eqn. (9) admits a unique solution written
b(γ, α). The ALS classifier thus predicts class 1 iff x > −b(γ, α).
Analytic formulae for the adversarial robustness accuracy of this ALS classifier as a function of 
is given in Appendix 1.3. The results of these experiments are presented in Fig. 1b. The boundary
between class 1 and 0 shifts from −b∗ = 0 to −b∗ = −b(γ, α) < 0. For example, b(2/3, 0.1) ≈
0.589: this improves the adversarial accuracy without decreasing standard accuracy.
We can see on Figure 1a that unlike the Bayes case, the ALS decision boundary is shifted towards
a region of low density for the two laws. Therefore, few points are close to the decision boundary,
so few adversarial attacks succeed. Traditional training does not take into account this geometrical
aspect of the classification problem, while LS does.
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3.2 Logit-squeezing and gradient-based method
Applying LS generates a logit-squeezing effect (see Theorem 1) which tends to prevent the model
from being over-confident in its predictions. This effect was investigated in [10] and is illustrated in
Fig. 2a.
In addition to this impact on the logits and predictions, LS also have an effect on the logits’ gradients
(with respect to x, see Fig. 2b) which can help explain why ALS trained models are more robust
to adversarial attacks. As described in [11], using a linear approximation, an attack is successful
if py(x, θ) + δT∇xpy(x, θ) ≤ pk(x, θ) + δT∇xpk(x, θ) for any k 6= y, where δ is the attack
perturbation. With an FGSM-like attack of strength , it thus works if  ≥ py(x,θ)−pj(x,θ)||∇xpy(x;θ)−∇xpj(x;θ)||1
i.e. if  ≥ 1||∇xzy(x,θ)−∇xzj(x,θ)||1 .
By reducing this logit vector gradient gap, LS provides more robust models at least against gradient-
based attack methods.
(a) Regularization effect: illustration of logit squeez-
ing as a function of α. Darker is more confidence.
(b) Gradient gap reduction: density of the gradient
gap for a linear model.
Figure 2: Effects of LS
3.3 Why does LS help adversarial robustness ?
Pointwise, the SmoothCE loss induces different costs compared to the traditional CE loss. As
discussed in Sec. 3.2, over-confidently classified points are more penalized. Likewise, very badly
classified points are also more penalized. The model is thus forced to put the decision boundary in a
region with few data points (see Section 3.1). If not, either the penalty term Rn(θ) or the general
term Ln(θ), defined in Sec. 2.1, will be too high. The underlying geometry of the dataset is thus
better addressed compared to a traditional training: boundaries are closer to "the middle", i.e the
margin between two classes is bigger (similar to how SVM operates), leading to increased robustness.
Traditional CE loss, however, induces a direct power relationship: the boundary between two classes
is pushed close to the smallest one.
4 Experiments
We run the four different attacks1 on different set ups (datasets MNIST, CIFAR10, SVHN and models
MLP, LeNet, ResNet18). For comparison purposes, we also run the attacks on reference models:
the same models used in the experiments but without any LS or regularization (see black lines in
Fig. 3d and α = 0 values for Figs. 3a, 3b, 3c); and models trained using adversarial training against
FGSM as defined in [4]. The modified loss is given by L˜(x, y, θ) = (1− β)CE(x, y, θ) + βCE(x+
εsign(∇xCE(x, y, θ)), y, θ), and here β = 0.5, ε = 0.25 (see purples lines in Fig. 3). Some results
are shown in Fig. 3, and more numerical results are presented in Tables 2 to 6 (see Appendix 1.4).
One can see that for all attacks but FGSM, at least one of our LS methods perform better than
adversarial training (see Figs 3a, 3b, 3c). This suggests that LS is a general defense method that
1In the CIFAR10 ResNet and SVHN LeNet set-ups, the number of iteration for C&W attack is sub-optimal.
More iterations would have broken the models, however, C&W is hardly scalable because it requires a long time
to train, especially for sophisticated models like ResNet.
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can perform well on many different attacks (even on FGSM: adversarial training is better but LS
still performs well); unlike adversarial training which is excellent but only on one attack. However,
the optimal value of α is not universal, and seem to depend both on the set-up (dataset and NN
architecture) and on the attack.
On the whole, ALS and BLS give better results than SLS and SBLS, except on one set-up (C&W
attack on MNIST LeNet Fig. 3a). They thus should be preferred when implementing LS. Furthermore,
the temperature hyperparameter for BLS method does not seem to have a great impact on the results.
T = 0.001 for example is a good default value.
Altogether, we see that LS is a good candidate for improving the adversarial robustness of NNs.
(a) MNIST LeNet.  = 0.3 for FGSM and BIM (b) CIFAR10 ResNet.  = 0.1 for FGSM and BIM
(c) SVHN LeNet.  = 0.1 for FGSM and BIM (d) FGSM: all set-ups
Figure 3: Experiments: Figs 3a, 3b, 3c show the evolution of adversarial accuracy as a function of
α for different models against all attacks. Fig 3d shows the evolution of adversarial accuracy as a
function of  for all models agains FGSM.
5 Conclusion
We have proposed a general framework for Label-Smoothing (LS) as well as a new variety of LS
methods (Section 2) as a way to alleviate the vulnerability of Deep learning image classification
algorithms. We developed a theoretical understanding of LS (Theorem 1 and Section 3) and our
results have been demonstrated empirically via experiments on real datasets (CIFAR10, MNIST,
SVHN), neural-network models (MLP, LeNet, ResNet), and SOTA attack models (FGSM, BIM,
DeepFool, C&W).
LS improves the adversarial accuracy of neural networks, and can also boost standard accuracy,
suggesting a connection between adversarial robustness and generalization. Even though our results
(see Section 3) provide evidence that LS classifiers are more robust because they take the dataset
geometry into better consideration, better understanding of the adversarial phenomenon and the
representations learned by NNs would be desirable.
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Moreover, compared to other robustification methods (e.g adversarial training), the ease of implemen-
tation of LS is very appealing: it is simple, fast, with one interpretable hyperparameter (α ∈ [0, 1]).
Being costless is one of the major benefits of implementing LS. Experimental results (section 4)
could be completed with various NNs and datasets, which is also left for future works.
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1 Appendix
1.1 LS optimization program
Proof of Theorem 1. Recall that yi ∈ ∆K is the one-hot encoding of the example xi with label
yi ∈ [[1,K]]. By direct computation, one has
1
n
n∑
i=1
SmoothCE(xi, qi; θ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
qTi ln(p(xi; θ)) = −
1
n
n∑
i=1
((1− α)yi + αq′i)T ln(p(xi; θ))
= − 1
n
n∑
i=1
yTi ln(p(xi; θ)) + α
1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − q′i)T ln(p(xi; θ))
= Ln(θ) + α
1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − q′i)T zi,
where zi ∈ RK is the vector logits for example xi.
1.2 Analytic solution for ALS formula
Lemma 1. Let α ∈ [0, 1], t ∈ [[k]], and g ∈ Rk. The general solution of the problem
argmax
q∈∆k, q(t)≥1−α
qT g (10)
is q∗ = (1 − α)δt + αq¯, where q¯ is any solution to the problem with 1 − α = 0, namely q¯ ∈
argmaxq∈∆kq
T g
Proof. Consider the invertible change of variable q = h(q¯) := (1 − α)δ1 + αq¯ which maps the
simplex ∆k unto itself, with inverse q¯ = h−1(x) = α−1(x− (1− α)δ1).
It follows, that
min
q∈∆k|q1≥1−α
qT b = min
q¯∈∆k|q¯1≥0
((1− α)δ1 + αq¯)T b = min
q¯∈∆k
((1− α)δ1 + αq¯)T b
which is attained by
q¯∗ ∈ argminq¯∈∆k q¯T b = ConvHull(argminkj=1bj),
yielding q∗ = (1− α)δ1 + αq¯∗.
1.3 Triangular experiment: formulae for the ALS classifier accuracies
We have, assuming 0 ≤ b ≤ 1:
P (1) = P (y = 1)P (x > −b|y = 1) = γ
(
1− (1− b)
2
2
)
P (2) = P (y = −1)P (x > −b|y = 0) = (1− γ) (1− (1− b)2)
P (3) = P (y = 1)P (x < −b|y = 1) = γ (1− b)
2
2
P (4) = P (y = −1)P (x < −b|y = 0) = (1− γ) (1− b)
2
2
and thus c0(α) = 1− γ(1− α)− (1− b)
2
2
(1− γ + α)
The ALS classifier predicts 1 iff x > −b(γ, α), where b(γ, α) is the solution of the equation
b = ln
(
e2−e2c0(α)
e1(e2c0(α)−1)
)
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Assuming 0 < b(γ, α) < 1, the standard accuracy of this ALS classifier is given by:
acc(h) = P(x,y)(h(x) = y)
= P (y = 1)P (x > −b(γ, α)|y = 1) + P (y = 0)P (x < −b(γ, α)|y = 0)
= γ
(
1− (1− b(γ, α))
2
2
)
+ (1− γ)(1− b(γ, α))2
= γ + (1− b(γ, α))2
(
1− 3
2
γ
)
and the adversarial one by:
acc(h) = P(x,y)(hα(x+ ∆x) = y,∀ |∆x| ≤ )
= P (y = 1)P (x−  > −b(γ, α)|y = 1) + P (y = 0)P (x+  < −b(γ, α)|y = 0)
= γP (x > −b(γ, α) + |y = 1) + (1− γ)P (x < −b(γ, α)− |y = 0)
= Case 1 if  ≤ b(γ, α) and  ≤ 1− b(γ, α)
= Case 2 if  ≤ b(γ, α) and  > 1− b(γ, α)
= Case 3 if  > b(γ, α) and  ≤ 1− b(γ, α)
= Case 4 if  > b(γ, α) and  > b(γ, α)
⇔

Case 1 = acc(h) +
(
1− 3
2
γ
)
2 − 2(1− b(γ, α))
(
1− 1
2
γ
)
Case 2 = γ
(
1− (1− b(γ, α)− )
2
2
)
Case 3 =
(
1− 1
2
γ
)
b(γ, α)2 +
(
1− 1
2
γ
)
(1− )2 − 2(1− )b(γ, α)
(
1− 3
2
γ
)
Case 4 = γ
(
(1 + b(γ, α)− )2
2
)
1.4 Experiments: numerical results
The following tables show the adversarial accuracy for different model set-ups, defenses and attacks.
In each table, we have the adversarial accuracies for one attack (or the standard accuracies in Table
6). Accuracies for LS-regularized models are presented for three different choices of α : 0.005, 0.1
and 0.4. For FGSM and BIM ((Tables 2 and 3), we chose 3 different values of the attack strength
 : 0.05, 0.2 and 0.4. For example, the adversarial accuracy against FGSM attack with  = 0.2 for
the BLS-regularized model with α = 0.005 using MNIST LeNet set-up is shown in Table 2 and is
equal to 0.838.
Moreover, we highlighted in color the best accuracy for a set-up and a particular attack (or attack and
strength in the case of FGSM and BIM). Each set-up corresponds to one color (e.g. light yellow for
MNIST Linear and red for SVHN LeNet). If the best accuracy is less than the accuracy obtained with
random predictions (i.e. 0.1 in all our set-ups), it is not highlighted. For example, the best accuracy
against FGSM of strenght  = 0.05 in the CIFAR LeNet set-up is equal to 0.160 and is obtained by
both a ALS and BLS-regularized NN with α = 0.1. Overall, adversarial training is better on FGSM
(more colors on the adversarial training lines in Table 2 compared to other defenses), but ALS and
BLS are better on other attacks. SBLS is better only against C&W. In Table 6, we see that ALS, BLS
and SLS NNs are always better or equivalent to a normal classifier (no regularization, no defense
method) in terms of standard accuracy.
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Table 2: FGSM
 = 0.05  = 0.2  = 0.4
α val. 0.005 0.1 0.4 0.005 0.1 0.4 0.005 0.1 0.4
ALS
MNIST Linear 0.832 0.870 0.857 0.507 0.526 0.489 0.450 0.465 0.432
MNIST LeNet 0.957 0.959 0.954 0.847 0.732 0.639 0.822 0.561 0.130
CIFAR LeNet 0.098 0.160 0.002 0.069 0.147 0.002 0.067 0.151 0.001
CIFAR ResNet 0.245 0.365 0.433 0.099 0.125 0.123 / / /
SVHN LeNet 0.450 0.458 0.497 0.370 0.302 0.381 / / /
SLS
MNIST Linear 0.818 0.848 0.840 0.532 0.470 0.412 0.506 0.437 0.384
MNIST LeNet 0.956 0.956 0.954 0.840 0.764 0.656 0.823 0.699 0.229
CIFAR LeNet 0.119 0.153 0.127 0.097 0.134 0.101 0.092 0.136 0.093
CIFAR ResNet 0.254 0.345 0.389 0.098 0.115 0.116 / / /
SVHN LeNet 0.404 0.472 0.395 0.353 0.312 0.195 / / /
BLS
MNIST Linear 0.821 0.868 0.858 0.494 0.525 0.494 0.442 0.457 0.441
MNIST LeNet 0.956 0.958 0.954 0.838 0.741 0.642 0.812 0.616 0.131
CIFAR LeNet 0.085 0.160 0.122 0.055 0.141 0.107 0.055 0.130 0.114
CIFAR ResNet 0.252 0.346 0.450 0.096 0.129 0.138 / / /
SVHN LeNet 0.430 0.442 0.327 0.352 0.293 0.153 / / /
SBLS
MNIST Linear 0.763 0.804 0.639 0.530 0.353 0.327 0.431 0.212 0.186
MNIST LeNet 0.955 0.956 0.929 0.855 0.695 0.491 0.836 0.279 0.141
CIFAR LeNet 0.103 0.143 0.136 0.061 0.098 0.068 0.058 0.085 0.053
CIFAR ResNet 0.191 0.159 0.231 0.077 0.079 0.093 / / /
SVHN LeNet 0.449 0.375 0.277 0.378 0.157 0.149 / / /
Normal
classifier
MNIST Linear 0.791 0.003 0.000
MNIST LeNet 0.956 0.498 0.022
CIFAR LeNet 0.049 0.002 0.009
CIFAR ResNet 0.090 0.052 /
SVHN LeNet 0.195 0.006 /
Adv.
training
MNIST Linear 0.914 0.829 0.936
MNIST LeNet 0.970 0.931 0.754
CIFAR LeNet 0.011 0.542 0.515
CIFAR ResNet 0.078 0.525 0.222
SVHN LeNet 0.191 0.815 0.724
Table 3: BIM
 = 0.05  = 0.2  = 0.4
α val. 0.005 0.1 0.4 0.005 0.1 0.4 0.005 0.1 0.4
ALS
MNIST Linear 0.816 0.854 0.845 0.429 0.485 0.456 0.420 0.472 0.435
MNIST LeNet 0.947 0.946 0.945 0.813 0.614 0.606 0.811 0.560 0.484
CIFAR LeNet 0.064 0.140 0.000 0.055 0.137 0.000 0.054 0.136 0.000
CIFAR ResNet 0.102 0.167 0.248 0.046 0.076 0.074 / / /
SVHN LeNet 0.403 0.408 0.470 0.386 0.324 0.435 / / /
SLS
MNIST Linear 0.801 0.829 0.826 0.495 0.447 0.398 0.492 0.439 0.391
MNIST LeNet 0.946 0.942 0.942 0.817 0.700 0.398 0.815 0.689 0.165
CIFAR LeNet 0.093 0.131 0.100 0.087 0.128 0.096 0.087 0.128 0.094
CIFAR ResNet 0.135 0.142 0.230 0.051 0.035 0.046 / / /
SVHN LeNet 0.371 0.421 0.322 0.362 0.345 0.193 / / /
BLS
MNIST Linear 0.803 0.853 0.841 0.534 0.481 0.458 0.528 0.470 0.443
MNIST LeNet 0.946 0.944 0.947 0.835 0.645 0.532 0.834 0.603 0.389
CIFAR LeNet 0.062 0.140 0.103 0.056 0.136 0.097 0.055 0.135 0.097
CIFAR ResNet 0.153 0.142 0.265 0.060 0.043 0.075 / / /
SVHN LeNet 0.435 0.393 0.266 0.424 0.322 0.142 / / /
SBLS
MNIST Linear 0.736 0.772 0.597 0.470 0.227 0.299 0.370 0.091 0.252
MNIST LeNet 0.945 0.945 0.914 0.841 0.359 0.239 0.808 0.126 0.072
CIFAR LeNet 0.074 0.114 0.090 0.057 0.077 0.036 0.055 0.068 0.028
CIFAR ResNet 0.054 0.021 0.045 0.010 0.008 0.018 / / /
SVHN LeNet 0.423 0.265 0.200 0.383 0.073 0.116 / / /
Normal
classifier
MNIST Linear 0.776 0.001 0.000
MNIST LeNet 0.946 0.114 0.000
CIFAR LeNet 0.015 0.000 0.000
CIFAR ResNet 0.003 0.000 /
SVHN LeNet 0.117 0.000 /
Adv.
training
MNIST Linear 0.899 0.128 0.001
MNIST LeNet 0.968 0.894 0.316
CIFAR LeNet 0.000 0.000 0.000
CIFAR ResNet 0.000 0.000 0.000
SVHN LeNet 0.007 0.000 0.000
Table 4: DeepFool
Adv. acc.
α val. 0.005 0.1 0.4
ALS
MNIST Linear 0.037 0.092 0.341
MNIST LeNet 0.047 0.299 0.529
CIFAR LeNet 0.005 0.006 0.001
CIFAR ResNet 0.040 0.030 0.33
SVHN LeNet 0.020 0.010 0.008
SLS
MNIST Linear 0.036 0.080 0.683
MNIST LeNet 0.035 0.183 0.380
CIFAR LeNet 0.006 0.007 0.008
CIFAR ResNet 0.073 0.049 0.057
SVHN LeNet 0.020 0.007 0.007
BLS
MNIST Linear 0.033 0.088 0.414
MNIST LeNet 0.031 0.314 0.500
CIFAR LeNet 0.007 0.008 0.008
CIFAR ResNet 0.051 0.059 0.032
SVHN LeNet 0.024 0.006 0.006
SBLS
MNIST Linear 0.035 0.152 0.516
MNIST LeNet 0.028 0.142 0.305
CIFAR LeNet 0.005 0.006 0.006
CIFAR ResNet 0.050 0.037 0.064
SVHN LeNet 0.024 0.014 0.038
Normal
classifier
MNIST Linear 0.025
MNIST LeNet 0.050
CIFAR LeNet 0.009
CIFAR ResNet 0.036
SVHN LeNet 0.031
Adv.
training
MNIST Linear 0.192
MNIST LeNet 0.175
CIFAR LeNet 0.020
CIFAR ResNet 0.052
SVHN LeNet 0.057
Table 5: CW
Adv. acc.
α val. 0.005 0.1 0.4
ALS
MNIST Linear 0.014 0.056 0.073
MNIST LeNet 0.020 0.042 0.084
CIFAR LeNet 0.000 0.002 0.000
CIFAR ResNet 0.022 0.098 0.205
SVHN LeNet 0.010 0.039 0.056
SLS
MNIST Linear 0.013 0.025 0.031
MNIST LeNet 0.022 0.046 0.058
CIFAR LeNet 0.000 0.004 0.000
CIFAR ResNet 0.029 0.087 0.159
SVHN LeNet 0.006 0.044 0.044
BLS
MNIST Linear 0.014 0.035 0.059
MNIST LeNet 0.018 0.046 0.062
CIFAR LeNet 0.000 0.004 0.000
CIFAR ResNet 0.019 0.089 0.231
SVHN LeNet 0.006 0.028 0.045
SBLS
MNIST Linear 0.017 0.071 0.007
MNIST LeNet 0.016 0.128 0.474
CIFAR LeNet 0.002 0.000 0.014
CIFAR ResNet 0.063 0.173 0.106
SVHN LeNet 0.009 0.062 0.052
Normal
classifier
MNIST Linear 0.015
MNIST LeNet 0.026
CIFAR LeNet 0.000
CIFAR ResNet 0.015
SVHN LeNet 0.031
Adv.
training
MNIST Linear 0.037
MNIST LeNet 0.433
CIFAR LeNet 0.020
CIFAR ResNet 0.052
SVHN LeNet 0.195
Table 6: Std. accuracies
Std. acc.
α val. 0.005 0.1 0.4
ALS
MNIST Linear 0.979 0.981 0.976
MNIST LeNet 0.990 0.990 0.989
CIFAR LeNet 0.623 0.664 0.148
CIFAR ResNet 0.887 0.890 0.889
SVHN LeNet 0.890 0.894 0.879
SLS
MNIST Linear 0.978 0.981 0.975
MNIST LeNet 0.989 0.990 0.986
CIFAR LeNet 0.628 0.638 0.643
CIFAR ResNet 0.885 0.894 0.895
SVHN LeNet 0.892 0.894 0.889
BLS
MNIST Linear 0.978 0.981 0.976
MNIST LeNet 0.989 0.990 0.989
CIFAR LeNet 0.639 0.651 0.622
CIFAR ResNet 0.888 0.889 0.897
SVHN LeNet 0.891 0.890 0.841
SBLS
MNIST Linear 0.977 0.977 0.949
MNIST LeNet 0.989 0.988 0.975
CIFAR LeNet 0.628 0.619 0.572
CIFAR ResNet 0.883 0.881 0.840
SVHN LeNet 0.886 0.883 0.816
Normal
classifier
MNIST Linear 0.980
MNIST LeNet 0.990
CIFAR LeNet 0.635
CIFAR ResNet 0.886
SVHN LeNet 0.884
Adv.
training
MNIST Linear 0.987
MNIST LeNet 0.983
CIFAR LeNet 0.621
CIFAR ResNet 0.747
SVHN LeNet 0.875
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